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ABStRAct
Due process requires that a criminal defendant must satisfy a number of 
minimal conditions with regard to his/her cognitive abilities, i.e. that the 
defendant possesses trial competence. But what if a defendant —for 
instance, as a result of a mental disorder —does not possess the requisite 
competence? Would it be morally acceptable for the state to forcibly subject 
a defendant to psychotropic medication in order to restore his/her 
competence to stand trial? In this article it is argued that the reason that 
has constituted the main argument in favor of forcible medication of 
defendants —namely, that the state has an essential interest in convicting 
and sentencing defendants who are guilty of crime —is not as strong as has 
been assumed and may even, under certain conditions, speak against the 
use of forcible medication of trial incompetent defendants.
Keywords: Forcible medication; mental disorder; punishment; 
retributivism; trial competence; utilitarianism.
INTRODUCTION
Due process requires that a criminal defendant is fit to stand trial. To be fit, 
a defendant must satisfy a number of minimal conditions with regard to 
his cognitive abilities. For instance, he must be able to participate and assist 
in his own defense, to observe the judge, jury, witnesses and other courtroom 
participants, and —not least —to understand the course of the proceedings 
against him. In short, a defendant must possess trial competence.1
1  For a review of the modern discussion of the legal definitions of competence to 
stand trial, see Fogel et al. (2013). Competence to stand trial is usually regarded as intrinsic 
to the fairness of a trial process. The main argument to this effect is that the lack of compe-
tence may imply that the defendant fails to communicate exculpatory information. See, for 
instance, Mossman et al. (2007).
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But what if a defendant —for instance, as a result of a mental disorder 
—does not possess the requisite competence? What measures is the state 
justified in taking to ensure that a person, who may have committed a 
crime, is brought to trial? For instance, would it be acceptable for the state 
to forcibly subject a defendant to psychotropic medication in order to 
restore his/her competence to stand trial?
In contrast to other issues that are sometimes presented and discussed 
in legal philosophy, the question posed here is clearly not a purely 
hypothetical one dreamed up by imaginative legal philosophers. On the 
contrary, a number of criminal cases have in various ways directed 
attention to this question. The most significant case is undoubtedly that of 
Sell v. United States, in which a former dentist, Charles Sell, was indicted for 
Medicaid fraud and other offences. Sell had a long history of mental illness, 
and mental evaluations showed that he suffered from a delusional disorder 
(persecutory type). He was consequently held incompetent to stand trial. 
The case eventually found its way to the Supreme Court, which addressed 
the constitutional question as to whether the government was permitted 
to forcibly administer psychotropic medication solely to render a mentally 
ill defendant competent to stand trial for serious (but nonviolent) crimes. 
The court held that —under a set of strict conditions —the government 
was permitted to impose involuntary psychotropic (anti-psychotic) 
medication in order to bring a mentally ill defendant to trial.
Unsurprisingly, the case itself and the Supreme Court ruling have 
prompted numerous reactions and comprehensive legal discussions (see 
for instance, Baker 2003; Hilgers and Ramer 2004; Page 2005; Siegel 2008; 
Perlin 2009). The purpose here, however, is not to elaborate on the details 
of Sell, nor to contribute with considerations on the constitutionality of 
involuntary medication, but rather to address the overall question as to 
whether this method for establishing a defendant’s trial competence 
should be seen as morally acceptable. That this question poses an ethical 
dilemma seems obvious. On the one hand, it is usually regarded as crucial 
that the state upholds justice, and the bringing of defendants to court is an 
important step in this process. On the other, the forcible imposition of 
medication on someone is standardly regarded as highly problematic. In 
fact, what makes this side of the dilemma particularly problematic is the 
contextual nature of the concept of competence (see Annas 2004). Being 
competent is task-specific, in the sense that a person may be competent to 
do one thing but not another. However, this means that, insofar as the 
standards of competence differ (are lower) when it comes to the acceptance 
or refusal of medication than when it comes to proper trial participation, 
there can be cases in which an attempt to medically deal with the trial 
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incompetence of a defendant not only involves involuntary medication but 
medication of someone who may be fully competent to refuse medical 
treatment. Thus, the question of the acceptability of the use of forcible 
medication as a means of restoring trial competence comprises cases 
which —at least from the perspective of standard heath-care ethics —
would be regarded as morally highly dubious. 
The purpose in the following, it should be underlined, is not to make a 
case against forcible medication by definitively rejecting this method for 
the restoring of the trial competence of defendants. However, what I intend 
do is to direct attention to an aspect of the problem that has so far been 
ignored in the discussion and which has implications with regard to the 
ethical assessment of the matter. More precisely, it will be argued that the 
problem, which has usually been analyzed as a conflict between state 
interests, on the one hand, and the interests of the individual defendant, 
on the other, may on closer ethical scrutiny —involving both utilitarian 
and retributivist penal theoretical considerations —no longer constitute a 
genuine conflict; that is, that the reasons that have been presented as the 
main argument in favor of forcible medication of defendants are not as 
strong as has been assumed and may even, under certain conditions, speak 
against the use of forcible treatment of trial incompetent defendants.2 
In order to reach this conclusion, the paper proceeds as follows. In 
section 1, the interests that are at stake in the apparent conflict between 
the state and the individual defendant will be outlined. Subsequently —in 
section 2 —it is argued that what is usually regarded as the main interests 
of the state, namely, that the competence of mentally ill defendants is 
restored so that they can be brought to trial, may not —when analyzed 
from a penal theoretical perspective —be morally desirable after all. In 
section 3, a few objections to this argument are rejected. Finally, section 4 
summarizes and concludes. 
Before embarking upon the discussion, a few conditions should be 
mentioned concerning the scope of the considerations. Firstly, I shall not 
discuss whether the use of psychotropic medication is acceptable or 
unacceptable. Critics have sometimes held that this kind of treatment in 
itself is problematic. However, in the following it will be assumed that the 
use of psychotropic medication as a treatment of disorders, such as those 
that may imply a loss of abilities required for trial competence, is not in 
2  It is a fact that the state sometimes uses other compulsory methods in the way it 
deals with criminal defendants (e.g. pre-trial detention). Even though it would be interesting 
to consider what the arguments presented below imply with regard to other types of 
compulsory methods, this question clearly reaches far beyond what can possibly by 
discussed within the framework of this article. Thus, as mentioned, the focus here is place 
exclusively on forcible medication of incompetent defendants.
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itself unacceptable. I believe that, given the widespread use of this type of 
medication for mentally ill patients and the fact that few (I guess) would 
object to this treatment if a defendant were to ask for it himself in order to 
achieve trial competence, this is not a strong assumption. 
Secondly, the imposition of involuntary medication for the purpose of 
restoring trial competence has in legal contexts been held to implicate that 
important individual and state interests have to be weighed against each 
other in order to determine whether this practice is constitutionally 
acceptable. For instance, in Sell the Supreme Court recognized the 
individual’s basic liberty interest in avoiding unwanted medical treatment, 
but also held that his interests were insufficient to outweigh the state’s 
interests in bringing someone to trial. In the following it will, as indicated, 
be argued that “state interests” do not provide as strong reasons in favor of 
forcible medication as is often assumed if seen from an ethical perspective. 
Thus, from the outset I shall assume that it is relevant to include what is 
usually regarded as the state-interests perspective in an adequate ethical 
evaluation. Clearly, not everyone will accept this. For instance, some might 
hold that forcible medication in itself violates a moral constraint and that 
such treatment, therefore, is morally wrong regardless of state interests, 
that is, independently of whatever moral reasons may point in the opposite 
direction. Since the point in the following is to show that there may be 
stronger reasons against forcible medication of trial incompetent 
defendants even if one accepts that the most plausible moral answer must 
be based on some sort of weighing of pros and cons, the constraint-based 
position will not itself be considered any further.3 
Thirdly, given the context-dependent nature of the concept of 
competence, participation in the different processes of the work of the 
criminal justice system may require different sorts of competence. Thus, 
questions of competence have been raised not only in relation to fitness for 
trial participation —which itself has opened up a discussion of the 
distinction between being competent to stand trial and being competent 
enough to conduct trial proceedings oneself —but also in relation to both 
pre-trial settings (e.g. competence to make confessions or participate in 
line-ups) and post-trial settings (e.g. competence to motion new trials, 
parole, and —perhaps more bizarrely —to be executed).4 However, even 
3  More precisely, what I am arguendo assuming is that an absolutist interpretation 
of a constraint against forcible medication is not plausible. A threshold interpretation of 
such a constraint would still make it necessary to consider the weight of the reasons in favor 
of forcible medication in order to reach a conclusion on whether this practice is morally 
acceptable.
4  For a discussion of the use of medication as an instrument to render people 
competent for execution, see e.g., Daugherty (2001) or Latzer (2003).
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though the argument that will be advanced here may have implications 
with regard to several of these aspects of criminal justice competence, the 
ensuing discussion will be limited strictly to the question of competence to 
stand trial.
1.  THE PROS AND CONS OF FORCIBLE MEDICATION 
Whether it is acceptable to impose psychotropic medication for the 
purpose of restoring competence to stand trial is a question which, as 
indicated, has typically been analyzed in terms of a conflict between the 
interests of the individual and the interests of the state. Strictly speaking, 
this way of phrasing the conflict may not be adequate in an ethical analysis: 
There may be moral reasons that cannot be reduced to interests and there 
may be interests that are not morally relevant. Be that as it may, let us now 
start take a closer view on the arguments that have been advanced for and 
against forcible medication of trial incompetent defendants. 
The arguments against the use of forcible medication of defendants fall 
into two categories: Either they concern the impact on the defendant or the 
possibility of obtaining a fair criminal process. Starting with the first class 
of arguments, the most obvious objection to forcible medication of 
incompetents is that this treatment constitutes an imposition of something 
against the will of the defendant. The appeal of this objection is probably 
most obvious in cases in which there is the above-mentioned combination 
of a defendant who, while trial incompetent, is still competent to refuse 
medical treatment. The shift in modern health-care ethics, from an earlier 
period dominated by a paternalist view on medical treatment to the view 
that favors competent individuals’ right to self-determination, is often 
emphasized as one of the most significant changes in the ethical approach 
to treatment. Today, it is widely accepted that patients have a right to refuse 
medication, even if it would be in their own best overall interest, or in the 
interest of others, that they be medicated. As a recent medical theorist has 
pointed out that “… anyone who wishes to ague for forced or mandated 
treatment on the grounds that society will greatly benefit is working up a 
very steep ethical hill” (Caplan 2008). Whether the problem of imposing 
something on someone against his or her will is best described as a problem 
concerning lack of respect for autonomy (which constitutes the standard 
phrasing in medical ethics) or in other ways is not crucial here. It is 
sufficient to note that the imposition of medication against a defendant’s 
will constitutes a first reason against this sort of practice.
Another reason that has frequently been presented in the debate 
concerns the undesirable effects of medication. Psychotropic medication, 
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for instance antipsychotic drugs, is known to have a number of side effects. 
In the Amicus Curiae Brief in relation to Sell, the American Psychological 
Association highlighted a number of both common and rare serious side 
effects (e.g. including “extrapyramidal” reactions —a family of disorders 
such as tardive dyskinesia, Parkinsonism, and dystonia —blurred vision, 
sedation, orthostatic hypotension, dizziness, etc.).5 However, it should also 
be underlined that more recent antipsychotics have a more favorable side-
effect profile than older classes of drugs and that attempts to restore trial 
competence may involve only temporary medication. 
Leaving aside the possible medical side effects, there is another 
potentially very serious effect that forcible medication may have on a 
defendant: If the medication is successful and trial competence is restored 
this may imply that the defendant is convicted and ends up being punished 
perhaps serving a long prison sentence, depending of course on the nature 
of the crime. According to some commentators, it is reasonable to believe 
that this prospect contributed to Sell’s refusal of medication. Now, whether 
the risk of conviction and subsequent punishment should be regarded as 
an objection against forcible medication is controversial. It might be held 
that, since the whole point of initiating forcible medication is to make it 
possible to determine the guilt of a defendant and to punish him if he is 
convicted, the suffering of the punishment cannot plausibly constitute an 
objection against medication. However, the answer ultimately depends on 
penal theoretical considerations and, as we shall return to shortly, there 
may be reasons to regard the risk of punishment as a drawback in the 
evaluation of forcible medication. 
So much for the set of reasons referring to the direct effects on the 
defendant who is made the subject of compulsory medical treatment. The 
other class of reasons that has been advanced against the use of forcible 
medication concerns the possibility of receiving a fair trial. The whole 
purpose of such medication is to make it possible for the defendant to 
stand trial. But, as several commentators have pointed out, the fact that 
trial competence is in this way restored does not imply that the trial will be 
fair. On the contrary, the side effects of medically induced trial competence 
may themselves turn out to compromise fairness. This could happen in 
various ways. First, depending upon how precisely the formal criteria for 
trial competence is put, it may be possible that a defendant’s abilities are 
restored to a level which satisfy the competence criteria, even though the 
medication itself implies that the defendant is still to some extent 
cognitively impaired (e.g. if his memory is affected). Second, and more 
5  Counsel for Amicus Curiae, American Psychological Association (2002: 20-25). 
See also Baker (2003).
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importantly, several of the above-mentioned side effects (e.g. Parkinsonian 
tremors) may adversely affect a judge’s or a jury’s opinion of the defendant. 
In the same vein, a flattened emotional reaction of a defendant who, as a 
result of medication, appears bored, cold, or devoid of compassion and 
remorse, may prejudice jurors and thereby threaten basic fair-trial rights.6 
Finally, it has been underlined that medication may diminish a defendant’s 
possibility of pleading insane at the moment of the crime. In a case in 
which a defendant appears too normal in the court this may affect, and in 
the worst case, undermine the persuasiveness of an insanity defense (see 
e.g. Graber 1979: 8ff). That this constitutes a genuine risk has been 
demonstrated in empirical studies which have found that jurors were more 
likely to hold a defendant not responsible on account of mental disorder if 
the defendant was psychotic at the time of the trial than if he or she appeared 
normal (see Whittemore and Ogloff 1995).
The above-outlined reasons concerning the direct impact of forcible 
medication on the defendant, and on the defendant’s possibility of 
receiving a fair trial, roughly summarizes the main arguments that have 
been presented against this way of dealing with impaired trial competence. 
Let us now move on by turning to the argument that has typically been 
advanced in the opposite direction. What reasons could there possibly be 
in favor of subjecting defendants with impaired trial competence to 
compulsory medical treatment? As already indicated, the answer is simpler 
than the objections against this practice. The argument, unsurprisingly, 
amounts to the state’s basic interest in bringing people who may have 
committed crimes to trial.  That this interest is significant seems prima 
facie hard to dispute. A number of court decisions have addressed the 
state’s interest in adjudicating guilt and innocence and have characterized 
this interest as “essential” (see Morse 2003: 320). Moreover, few would 
object to the fact that a comprehensive and costly system has been designed 
with the purpose of bringing people who may have committed a crime to 
trial. And several other ways in which this system works clearly indicate 
the significance usually attributed to the possibility of having a trial. For 
instance, as Morse has pointed out, the state may also take rather drastic 
initiatives —such as incarceration and perhaps even involuntary 
medication —of a material witness if the obtaining of a testimony of this 
witness constitutes the only effective means by which the state could try a 
defendant (Morse 2003: 321). If this treatment of a purely innocent witness 
is acceptable then the interest in bringing a defendant to trial must be 
significant. 
6  See Counsel for Amicus Curiae. American Psychological Association (2002: note 7: 
25); or Morse (2003: 319).
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But where does this presentation of the reasons that have been presented 
for and against the use of forcible medication on trial incompetent 
defendants lead us? Given the initial and generally accepted assumption 
that the moral legitimacy of the use of forcible medication cannot be 
settled merely by focusing on the reasons on the one side of the scale, the 
complicated question one is left with is how the outlined reasons should be 
weighed against each other. How should we balance the protection of the 
individual against the interest in bringing defendants to trial? On this 
point theorists have been split. However, the point is not to engage in 
considerations on the weighing of the pros and cons but rather to adopt a 
more cautious attitude by asking whether the depicted picture of the 
outlined reasons is apposite. More precisely, what we shall now see is that 
on closer scrutiny it is not so obvious that the pro-side of the scale carries 
the weight with which, as we have just seen, it is usually attributed.  
2.  THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF A TRIAL 
Why is it so important for the state to be able to bring a defendant to trial? 
Why does this constitute an essential interest? The obvious answer is that 
there are strong moral reasons in favor of punishing people who have 
violated the law and that the criminal trial constitutes a vital step in the 
process of identifying those who fall into this category, that is, those who 
are in fact guilty of a crime. Unsurprisingly, this is also the answer that has 
been given in several Supreme Court decisions. For instance, in United 
States v. Weston it was specifically underlined that part of the state interest 
consisted in “demonstrating that transgressions of society’s prohibition 
will be met with an appropriate response by punishing offenders”.7 
Correspondingly, both “retributive” and “deterrent” functions were 
enunciated as ultimate goals of the state’s trial interests.8 However, further 
steps with regard to justificatory arguments are not usually taken. But this 
means that we are left with the basic question: How important is it that the 
state succeeds in punishing those individuals who have committed crimes 
but who belong to the group of defendants who are incompetent to stand 
trial? The answer to this question depends upon what constitutes the basic 
rationale behind state-inflicted punishment and, at this point, it is well 
known that there exists no theoretical consensus. Thus, let us now consider 
the question more thoroughly from the perspective of the two rival theories 
that have dominated penal theoretical thinking, that is, respectively from 
a utilitarian and a retributivist point of view.
7  U.S. v. Weston, 255 F. 3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 670 (mem.) 
2001: 880.
8  Ibid. p. 881.
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According to the utilitarian approach to punishment, the infliction of 
punishment on perpetrators is justified on the ground of future desirable 
consequences that will follow from this practice.9 Though there may be 
different types of desirable consequences, the cardinal implication of 
punishment is usually held to be crime prevention. Thus, seen from the 
perspective of crime prevention is it important to ensure that those 
defendants who have committed crimes, but who are trial incompetent, 
are brought to trial and subsequently punished? 
First, if the question is considered in terms of general prevention, then it 
is far from clear that the answer is in the affirmative. It is generally believed 
that the existence of a punishment system has a general crime-preventive 
effect (see e.g. Nagin 1998). That is, the possibility of being punished deters 
potential criminals from engaging in criminal activity. However, when it 
comes to the question as to how the severity and likelihood of punishment 
affect general prevention, the picture becomes more complicated.10 The 
only way in which the punishment of more individuals —that is, those who 
are found guilty after being forcibly medicated to stand trial —can affect 
general crime prevention apparently is if this will have an impact on the 
perceived likelihood of potential criminals being caught and punished if 
they break the law. But is it reasonable to believe that there will be such an 
effect? There are several reasons to doubt this. 
First, the number of people who do not satisfy standards for trial 
competence is obviously small compared to the total number of people 
who end up in a criminal trial.11 Second, out of the group of defendants 
who are found trial incompetent, certainly not all would end up in court if 
forcible medication were accepted. Some may not be medicated because it 
is estimated that this would not have the desired effect, for instance, 
because from the outset they are simply too ill. In other cases defendants 
may be involuntarily medicated but may nevertheless not reach the level of 
cognitive ability required to make them trial competent. Third, even if 
mentally ill defendants become trial competent as a result of medication, 
9  In the following, I consider the utilitarian approach rather than a more general 
consequentialist approach. As is well known, the utilitarian approach to punishment 
constitutes the traditional rival to retributivism (very few non-utilitarian consequentialist 
approaches have been developed in modern penal theory). Moreover, there is no reason to 
believe that a non-utilitarian consequentialist theory (e.g. favoring the existence to several 
intrinsic values) will significantly change the main argument advanced below.
10  For an overview and discussion of research findings, see Durlauf and Nagin (2011).
11  Though some figures suggest that around 50.000 defendants are evaluation each 
year in the US it is reasonable to believe that many are referred inappropriately (e.g. they 
may be referred for strategic reasons). The vast majority of those defendants who are 
evaluated for competence each year are found competent (in some jurisdictions the majority 
is as high as 96 percent); see e.g. Winick (2002). 
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this obviously does not imply that they end up being punished; some will 
be found not guilty.12  Thus, in sum, there are reasons to believe that the 
use of forcible medication on trial incompetent defendants will only have 
a relatively very small impact on the total number of those who are punished 
in the criminal justice system. Furthermore, it should be noted that the 
perceived risk one faces if one engages in criminal activity is not only a 
result of one’s view on the probability of punishment but also (perhaps 
even more so) on the expectation one has on the likelihood of being caught. 
But it should be kept in mind that what we are here considering is the 
medication of people who are in fact defendants, that is, who have been 
caught (or turned themselves in) and this is so irrespective of the fact that 
they, as a result of a mental disorder, may not in the end be punished. Thus, 
all in all, that the relatively insignificant increase in the number of people 
who will be punished, if forcible medication is implemented, should 
manifest itself in the general perception of potential criminals of the 
probability of being punished in such a way as to affect crime rates seems 
highly unlikely.
However, even if there is no general crime preventive effect following 
from the use of forcible medication, such a scheme may nevertheless have 
desirable effects from a utilitarian point of view. The desired effects might 
consist in particular prevention; that is, the punitive treatment of the 
criminal may influence him to desist from future engagement in criminal 
activity. Though the idea of particular prevention as caused by deterrence 
or reform of the criminal has (in relation to imprisonment) been heavily 
criticized by criminologists and, despite the fact that the reference to 
general prevention has constituted the traditional justification in the 
utilitarian approach to punishment, it might be held that there is another 
way of reaching a particular preventive effect which is relevant in the 
present context, namely, incapacitation. A defendant who has committed a 
crime but who is too mentally ill to be trial competent may commit new 
crimes that could have been prevented had he or she been medicated, 
convicted, and placed behind bars. However, once again there is reason to 
doubt the empirical soundness of this argument.13 Given the fact that 
imprisonment may have a criminogenic effect, this would have to be 
weighed against whatever is gained in terms of crime prevention caused by 
temporary incapacitation.14 Moreover, in the present context, that is, when 
we are considering the value of forcible medication of mentally ill 
12  For instance, by reason of insanity.
13  For a general review of research showing that the crime preventive benefits of 
incapacitation are highly uncertain, see e.g. Nagin (1998).
14  For studies on the criminogenic effect of imprisonment, see e.g. Vieraitis (2007); 
or Camp and Gaes (2005).
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defendants, there is a further reason that should be kept in mind with 
regard to the possibility of a particular crime preventive effect, namely, 
that the alternative to a conviction and punishment for a trial incompetent 
criminal who is not compulsorily medicated may well not be freedom. 
Insofar as the defendant is regarded as dangerous he may be civilly 
committed. And even if the defendant is not dangerous —such as in the 
case of Charles Sell —the alternative may be long periods of hospitalization 
(according to some commentators Sell ended up spending more time 
being hospitalized than he would have spent in prison had he been 
involuntarily medicated, convicted, and punished). When this is taken 
into account, it becomes even less obvious that there would be a particular 
crime-preventive effect supporting the use of forcible medication to stand 
trial.
Considering the utilitarian approach to punishment there is, however, 
another side to the discussion that should be emphasized. In the previous 
outline of the reasons against forcible medication, the suffering the 
defendant would experience if he, after having been involuntarily 
medicated, were to be punished, was presented as a reason against this 
sort of forcible treatment. However, as also mentioned, this contention has 
been viewed with skepticism. It could be held that the fact that a criminal 
ends up suffering from a punishment cannot constitute a counterargument 
against forcible medication. However, as underlined, the answer to this 
ultimately depends upon the penal theoretical view one holds. In the 
perspective of the utilitarian theory of punishment, there is no doubt that 
the suffering of the person who is being punished counts as a reason 
against punishment. It is only if this disvalue of the suffering is outweighed 
by the greater amount of suffering that is prevented, that the punishment 
is morally justified. In Bentham’s original wording, the punishment, when 
considered in isolation, is “adding one evil to another” (Bentham 1962: 
306). To this it might perhaps be objected that, if the alternative is that a 
mentally ill person is forcibly hospitalized instead, then there is no real 
major difference when it comes to the drawbacks of forcible medication. 
However, this is not correct. Numerous studies have shown that prison 
conditions are clearly detrimental to persons suffering from a mental 
disorder. For instance, as has been summarized in WHO’s considerations 
on the consequences of imprisonment: “The impact on someone in good 
mental health would be negative; for people who arrive in a vulnerable 
state of mind, the damage can be irreparable”.15 Thus, that a person may 
end up by being punished —for instance, imprisoned for years or even 
15  WHO seminar on mental health in prisons, ”Prison Can Seriously Damage Your 
Mental Health”:http://www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk/uploads/documents/
Mentalhealthsmall.pdf (at p. 6).
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decades —does provide a strong reason against the use of forcible 
medication of defendants.
In sum, what we have seen is that, from a utilitarian penal theoretical 
perspective, it is far from obvious that the clearing of the ground for the 
punishment of trial incompetent defendants by the use of involuntary 
medication is as morally important as has hitherto been assumed. There is 
reason to doubt whether punishment of this small group of people will 
have any effect in terms of general crime prevention or with regard to 
particular prevention.16 But it is clear that there is a reason for not punishing 
this group qua the suffering that is inflicted on them. So much for the 
utilitarian view of punishment.
Let us now consider the question from the perspective of the retributivist 
view of punishment. As is often described, retributivism has dominated 
penal theoretical thinking for the last three or four decades and has been 
developing in various ways (see e.g. Duff and Garland 1994 or Ryberg 2004). 
However, in the present context it is not necessary to engage in 
considerations of the many different explanations that have been given as 
to why a perpetrator deserves punishment and of what precisely it is that 
the perpetrator deserves. Rather, what matters here are the penal 
distributional implications of retributivism. Thus, from a desert-theoretical 
perspective, how should we assess the moral significance of the fact that 
incompetent defendants who have committed crimes are brought to trial 
and subsequently punished? 
In contrast to the utilitarian approach to punishment, which has often 
been accused of holding only a contingent relation between guilt and 
punishment —precisely what has led to a number of traditional objections 
against this approach —this is not the case with regard to retributivism. 
However, if it is crucial, from a retributivist perspective, that those who 
have committed crimes are in fact appropriately punished then there 
seems to be a strong reason in favor of initiating procedures to ensure the 
adjudication of guilt or innocence of those who, from the outset, are not 
competent to stand trial. However, as we shall now see, on closer inspection 
the answer is not so simple. 
16  As mentioned, there could also be other effects that ought to figure in the utilitarian 
calculus. For instance, it would be necessary to consider how it affects crime victims if some 
defendants are, as a result of mental disorders, held incompetent to stand trial. Though it is 
difficult to make general estimates on this effect (it probably varies significantly between 
different types of crime) it should be noted that a least some studies have indicated that the 
imposition of suffering on the criminal does not constitute the main interest of crime victims; 
see, for instance, Strang (2002: chapter 1). Moreover, even if a victim is affected, this is only one 
of the many consequences that should be taken into account by the utilitarian. Thus, it is far 
from clear that this would tip the scale in favor of compulsory medication.
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The contention that retributivism provides a strong justice-based 
reason in favor of identifying those who are guilty of crime and, therefore, 
also in favor an imposition of involuntary medication on trial incompetent 
defendants, is based on one crucial presupposition, namely, that the 
punishments imposed on those who are guilty are in fact just. If criminals 
are punished in a way that violates the prescriptions of retributive penal 
distribution, the reason in favor of forcible treatment may well be 
undermined. Thus, the question is whether, in real life penal practice, 
there is reason to believe that criminals are punished in accordance with a 
retributivist view of punishment for different crimes. Obviously, for the 
simple reason that punishment levels vary between different jurisdictions, 
there is no universal answer to this question. However, interestingly, many 
theorists in the modern area of retributivism believe the answer to be in 
the negative. Two reasons have been presented in support of this.
The first reason follows from a view to which many recent theorists 
subscribe, namely, that there is, most markedly in the US but also in several 
other Western countries, a general problem of overcriminalization. A theorist 
in the retributivist camp such as Douglas Husak, who has comprehensively 
considered this issue, has even described overcriminalization as “the most 
pressing problem with the criminal law today” (Husak 2008: 3). What this 
simply means is that there are currently too many criminal laws on the books. 
But if this is correct, then it follows that there are cases in which the 
criminal sanction is being overused, that is, where people are being 
punished even when they do not deserve to be punished. In other words, one 
of the problems of overcriminalization is that it produces overpunishment. 
The other reason is not concerned with the scope of legal prohibitions 
but with the penal levels themselves. Several retributivists have underlined 
that many criminals of today are being punished in ways out of proportion 
with the gravity of the crime committed. For instance, Richard Singer has 
underlined that it is a misconception to think of the desert model as a 
derivative of a “throw away the key” approach to punishment; he has 
suggested that, in contrast to what is current practice in many jurisdictions, 
confinement should be reserved only for the most serious crimes and, even 
then, the duration of this should be relatively short (Singer 1979: 44). In the 
same vein, another influential retributivist, Jeffrie Murphy, holds that if 
the desert theory were to be followed consistently one would punish less 
and in more decent ways than one actually does (Murphy 1979: 230). And 
Andrew von Hirsch, who has extensively elaborated the penal distributional 
implications of retributivism, regards the proportionality principle as a 
means to restricting punishment, suggesting more precisely that terms of 
imprisonment even for the most serious crimes should seldom exceed five 
years (see e.g. von Hirsch 1993: chapter 10). 
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Suppose all this to be correct, that is, that there exists, as a result of 
overpunishment and excessive penal levels, a discrepancy between actual 
penal practice and what ideally constitutes the deserved punishments for 
different crimes, what does this imply with regard to the desirability of taking 
compulsory steps to ensure that criminal incompetent defendants are 
brought to trial and punished? The answer is not straightforward, depending 
upon the view the retributivist more precisely holds on penal distribution.
Suppose, firstly, that one subscribes to a so-called negative retributivist 
view, according to which desert is a necessary condition for justified 
punishment in the sense that the proportionate punishment for different 
crimes is interpreted as setting upper limits for punishment.17 In this view, 
it is morally prohibited to punish in a way that is excessive, that is, which is 
disproportionately severe given the gravity of the crime. However, it is not 
wrong, in terms of desert, to punish a criminal less severely. Thus, while 
this position restrains the imposition of punishment, it does not itself 
dictate how precisely a criminal should be punished. An answer to this 
question could be given by supplying the theory with further considerations; 
for instance, as has been suggested, by holding that below the 
proportionality levels the more precise severity of a punishment should be 
determined on utilitarian grounds. However, given this position, the 
answer concerning the desirability of ensuring that criminal defendants 
are medicated, brought to trial, and punished, becomes obvious. If there is 
a constraint against disproportionately severe punishing then, in a state of 
overpunishment, it will be wrong to punish these criminals. And since 
there is no constraint against disproportionately lenient punishing, it is all 
in all clear that, following a negative retributivist account, the punishment 
of the criminal defendants whose competence has been restored would 
not be desirable (in fact, it would be wrong).18
Suppose, alternatively, that one favors a traditional positive account of 
retributivism according to which justice implies that the proportionate 
levels of punishment for different crimes do not only set upper limits for 
acceptable punishment, but also set lower levels. That is, on this account 
the criminal should be punitively responded to with a punishment that is 
proportionate to the seriousness of the crime; both upward and downward 
deviations from this punishment would constitute violations of justice. 
Given this position, the picture becomes more complicated. 
17  The distinction between positive and negative retributivism was originally 
introduced by Mackie (1985: 207-8). See also Ryberg (2004).
18  A negative retributivist might of course hold that there are consequentialist 
reasons in favor of punishment. However, what is important is that such consequentialist 
reasons do not justify a violation of the constraint against transgressing the upper level of 
proportionate punishment.
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On the one hand, the moral significance of bringing incompetent 
defendants to trial cannot be justified in terms of the moral importance of 
imposing punishment on them, because —in a state of overpunishment 
—such punishment would, as we have just seen, be violating the 
proportionality constraint and would be morally wrong. On the other, if 
those defendants who are criminal are not convicted and punished, this 
will also violate the proportionality requirement. By being treated in a 
disproportionately lenient manner —that is, by not being punished —they 
will not get what they deserve. Confronted with these contradictory 
prescriptions, what should be regarded as retributively preferable: to 
punish too much or to abstain from punishing? In order to avoid being 
theoretically locked, that is, in order to be able to provide theoretical 
guidance with regard to what is preferable under these non-ideal 
conditions, one will have to engage in some sort of comparison of these 
two types of injustice. But it is fair to say that at this point retributivists 
have had very little to say. The modern retributivist discussion of penal 
distribution has been focused on clarifying what constitutes the 
proportionate punishments for different crimes —for instance, how should 
crimes be ranked in seriousness, how should punishments be scaled in 
severity, and how should these scales be anchored —not on the comparison 
and measurement of degrees of disproportionate punishments. However, 
it seems reasonable to hold that, if we wish to compare the two outlined 
states, then there are at least two aspects that must be taken into 
consideration.
The first aspect concerns the extent to which a punishment of someone 
who is respectively overpunished or underpunished (in casu not being 
punished) deviates from what constitutes the proportionate punishment. 
For instance, punishing a person who deserves five years in prison for one 
extra day may be considered a very slight deviation compared to not 
punishing this person at all. Correspondingly, punishing this person one 
day less than five years may constitute a minor deviation compared to 
locking this person up for a period of ten years. 
The second aspect concerns the moral weight of the two types of 
deviation; that is, how should we theoretically compare upward and 
downward deviations from the proportionate punishment? No one seems 
to believe that downward deviations are generally morally more 
problematic than upward deviations. This leaves two possibilities. Either it 
might be held that —leaving aside the just-mentioned question concerning 
the size of deviations —both downward and upward deviations constitute 
violations of justice and should be regarded with equal concern. In this 
view, there is symmetry with regard to the moral significance of over- and 
underpunishment. Alternatively, it might be held that, even though both 
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downward and upward deviation from the proportionate punishment is 
cause for concern, overpunishment is nevertheless worse than 
underpunishment. This is the asymmetry view. Which is then the more 
plausible? As mentioned, retributivists have on this point usually been 
silent. However, a recent exception is Göran Duus-Otterström, who has 
argued in favor of accepting asymmetry. What he suggests is that, while 
overpunishment involves excessive suffering, which the retributivist along 
with every other reasonable person must regard as morally problematic, 
this is not the case with regard to underpunishment. Therefore, even 
though both types of deviation are morally problematic, overpunishment 
is ceteris paribus worse (Duus-Otterström 2013).
Where does all this lead with regard to what positive retributivism 
implies, when it comes to the assessment of the alternatives of either 
bringing trial incompetents to trial and overpunishing those who have 
committed crimes or abstaining from bringing them to trial in the first 
place? Given the theoretical deficiencies in the development of the 
retributivist view on penal distribution, there is no clear answer. There is 
no generally accepted answer with regard to what constitutes the 
proportionate punishment for different crimes; even those retributivists 
who agree that the existing penal order is clearly excessive do not agree 
upon precisely what constitutes the appropriate penal levels. Moreover, 
even though there are arguments in favor of adopting an attitude of 
asymmetry, the question about the relative weight of over- and 
underpunishment is not fully resolved (for instance, even if the asymmetry 
view is correct, it is still not clear how one should balance deviations of 
different sizes, that is, how an instance of minor overpunishment should 
be assessed relatively to an instance of severe underpunishment). Thus, all 
in all, it is fair to conclude that it is simply not clear what positive 
retributivism implies. However, this is tantamount to holding that it is not 
clear whether there actually exists a positive retributivist ground in favor 
of ensuring, with the necessary medical means, that incompetent 
defendants are brought to trial and punished for their possible crimes.
Summing up, the point of departure of the above discussion is the 
argument that there is a strong reason in favor of administering 
psychotropic forcible medication of incompetent defendants, because the 
bringing of defendants to trial is a vital step in ensuring that those who 
have committed crimes are appropriately punished. However, as we have 
now seen, it is far from obvious that the punishment of this group of people 
carries the moral weight that this argument presupposes. From a utilitarian 
point of view, it is unclear whether or not it would be desirable to punish 
these people. In fact, it seems most reasonable to believe that nothing 
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would be gained either in terms of general prevention or in particular 
prevention. Nor is it clear that punishment of these people would be of 
moral significance if seen from a retributivist point of view. If it is correct, 
as several retributivist have suggested, that the existing penal order 
involves punishments that are out of proportion to those which criminals 
deserve then, from a negative retributivist view, it would seem preferable 
not to punish them while, from a positive retributivist perspective it was 
left theoretically unclear whether this would be preferable. Thus, on closer 
scrutiny the main argument in favor of forcible medication of trial 
incompetent defendants, namely, that this practice is justified on penal 
theoretical grounds, seems far less convincing than has generally been 
assumed in debate.
3.  A FEW OBJECTIONS
Some might find the above discussion premature. Thus, in the following I 
will try to present a little more support in favor of the conclusion by 
considering it in the light of a few possible objections.
A first objection is that the above considerations somehow rest on a 
confusion of the distinction between, on the one hand, the significance of 
establishing criminal guilt and, on the other, the sentencing of criminals. 
The guilt phase and the sentencing phase are separate parts in the work of 
the criminal court and this, it might be held, is precisely how it should be. 
Therefore, the discussion so far is defective by inappropriately drawing on 
penal theoretical considerations, that is, on considerations that are only 
relevant in relation to sentencing.
Now, it is of course correct that the establishment of guilt and the 
sentencing of someone who is found guilty are usually regarded as different 
phases of the work of the criminal court. However, obviously this does not 
show that the moral significance of adjudicating guilt or innocence is not 
provided by considerations of the moral importance of punishing 
criminals, that is, by penal theory. The argument, that it is important to be 
able to distinguish the guilty from the innocent because it is vital to punish 
those who are guilty, does not rest on confusion. However, though this 
answer is relatively straightforward, there may still be something to the 
objection. It could be held that the previous considerations have focused 
solely on penal theory, thereby ignoring the fact that the guilt phase of the 
criminal court could be valuable in itself. In other words, it might be 
suggested that one should not hold, what has been called, an instrumentalist 
view of the criminal trial.
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Whether an instrumentalist or a non-instrumentalist view on the guilty 
phase of the criminal court is correct is not a question that will be discussed 
more comprehensively here; and, as indicated in the outline of the pros 
and cons in the previous section, an argument based on a non-instrumental 
view has not been presented in the debate. Given the purpose of this article 
it is sufficient to keep in mind that even if there exist non-instrumental 
reasons in favor of adjudicating guilt and innocence this obviously does 
not show that there are no instrumental reasons. In fact, a rejection of 
instrumental reasons would be conspicuously implausible. Therefore, it is 
still relevant to show, as has been argued above, that the instrumental 
reasons —i.e. the reasons based on the moral significance of punishing 
criminals —do not carry the weight that one might at first sight believe and 
which has been underlined by courts and legal theorists. 
A second objection that may have struck some readers of the previous 
discussion concerns the scope of the outlined argument. The considerations 
have been presented as focusing on the question as to whether it is morally 
acceptable to forcibly medicate defendants who suffer from impairments 
of trial competence. However, it might seem as if the penal theoretical 
discussion has a wider scope. Put somewhat differently: If it is really correct 
to hold that there are no penal theoretical reasons in favor of bringing 
defendants to trial (or perhaps even reasons against doing so), does it not 
follow that there is no value in bringing anyone to trial? And if so, does this 
not seriously undermine the plausibility of the argument?
The answer to this objection is twofold. First, whether it is correct that 
the argument has a wider scope depends upon which penal theoretical 
view one is defending. From a utilitarian point of view, it is certainly not 
correct that the argument can be extrapolated to include all defendants. As 
we have seen, the argument was that curable trial incompetent defendants 
only constitute a very small fraction of all defendants, and that the fact that 
they are not punished will not have any effect in terms of crime prevention. 
The picture is obviously very different if the state decides to abstain from 
bringing all defendants to trial. As mentioned, it is generally agreed that 
this would have rather radical consequences for the general crime level.19 
Turning instead to the retributive view of punishment, the picture is a little 
different. If it is correct that in a state of overpunishment it would be 
preferable if trial incompetent defendants were not treated, brought to 
19  It is correct, though, that the arguments presented here could perhaps be applied 
in relation to other small fractions of defendants. Whether this is likely depends upon a more 
precise analysis of the members of this sub-group. However, in my view this should be 
regarded simply as an implication of the utilitarian approach rather than an objection. After 
all, as we have seen, the basic idea of the utilitarian outlook is that a punishment in itself 
should be regarded as an “evil”. 
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trial, and subsequently punished —or if it is simply theoretically unclear 
whether this would be preferable —then this conclusion may be 
extrapolatable to other defendants. However, this brings us to the second 
answer. Even if this wider implication is correct, that is, if the argument in 
this way has implications for other groups of defendants, this does not 
show that my argument concerning trial incompetence is defective. All it 
shows is that, under certain non-ideal conditions, retributivism may have 
some radical and perhaps not yet fully acknowledged implications; which 
is obviously not the same as holding that the argument I have advanced is 
flawed.
This brings us to the third and final objection. It might strike some that 
the previous conclusion concerning the implications of retributivism is 
premature or even dubious precisely because it is based on considerations 
of what this penal theory implies under non-ideal circumstances. Would it 
not be more reasonable to consider whether trial incompetent defendants 
should be forcibly treated under ideal conditions? And even if one insists 
on adopting a non-ideal perspective, is all that follows not simply that the 
state should change the existing penal order in order to adapt to what 
justice requires?  Moreover, would it not sound almost absurd if the state 
were to proclaim: “We do not take the requisite medical steps to ensure 
that trial incompetent defendants are brought to trial because we are 
already punishing in a way that is clearly excessive and hence unjust”?
The answer to the latter question is that this does not constitute an 
objection against the considerations that have been presented in this 
paper. What I have been considering is the overall question as to whether it 
is morally desirable to use compulsory measures to ensure that incompetent 
defendants end up in trial. However, the question as to what sort of (legal) 
justification the state should use if it decided not to accept forcible 
medication is another question. It is probably correct that the above 
proclamation would not only be highly unusual but might also have some 
undesirable consequences; however, this is fully consistent with the view 
defended here, namely, that it may not be morally desirable if the state 
medicates and punishes those who are trial incompetent.20
But what then of the first two questions? Why consider the implications 
of retributivism under non-ideal conditions? If one wishes to consider —as 
a purely philosophical exercise —whether forcible treatment of trial 
incompetent defendants is acceptable under ideal penal conditions, then 
this is of course quite all right. However, if the purpose is to try to clarify 
20  For instance, if it were held unconstitutional to forcibly medicate a defendant 
because this would violate certain legal rights, this would be fully consistent with the view 
presented here. 
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what we should do under the actual penal order when the criminal court is 
confronted with trial incompetent defendants —that is, if we wish to 
present guidance with regard to whether Charles Sell ought to be medicated 
against his will or, more generally, whether other people who are currently 
placed in corresponding situations should be made subject to compulsory 
treatment —then we have to engage in considerations under the actual 
existing penal order which, as we have seen, many modern retributivists 
themselves regard as non-ideal. And it is this practical, or for that sake, 
real-life approach to the question that has been taken in this article. 
Therefore, the answers to the above questions are: first, it is an ethical 
problem as to what we should actually do with trial incompetent defendants 
that drove the previous discussion and, second, even though retributivists 
should obviously try to change the existing penal order in accordance with 
the prescriptions of their theory, this does not alter the fact that the theory 
may also have implications in real-life circumstances under which the 
ideal has not yet been realized.
4.  CONCLUSION 
The time has come to sum up the previous considerations. What we have 
seen is that the question as to whether it is acceptable for the state to 
administer forcible medication in order to restore the competence of 
defendants who do not possess the cognitive abilities to stand trial, has 
usually and understandably been framed as a dilemma between, on the 
one hand, the interest or protection of the individual and, on the other, the 
significance of the fact that defendants are brought to trial in order to 
ensure the punishing of those who have committed crimes. However, what 
I have argued is that, on closer scrutiny, it is far less obvious than has often 
been assumed that state punishment of criminals really constitutes a 
reason in favor of the forcible medication of defendants. 
Following a utilitarian view of punishment, it was not clear that the 
imposition of punishment of this small group of criminals would contribute 
to anything in terms of crime prevention. And, without a gain in terms of 
crimes being prevented, it would actually be wrong to inflict punitive 
suffering on members of this fraction of defendants. From a retributivist 
point of view, things were a little more complicated. However, given the 
assumption —to which many modern retributivists subscribe —namely, 
that actual penal practice involves a problem of the overpunishment of 
criminals, it becomes much less obvious that there is a justice-based 
reason in favor of forcible treatment of incompetents. On a negative 
retributivist view, punishing these people under such conditions would be 
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wrong. While, from a positive retributivist point of view, it was not 
theoretically clear whether it would be desirable to punish these people. 
All in all —and as pointed out in the beginning —I do not believe these 
considerations warrant a strong case against the use of involuntary 
medication of trial incompetent defendants. Not all retributivists would 
accept the view of overpunishment, and the implications of positive 
retributivism under such conditions have not yet been theoretically 
satisfactorily developed. But I believe that the previous considerations 
justify the more modest conclusion, namely, that it is far less obvious than 
is usually assumed in the debate, that bringing about the punishment of 
criminals under the prevailing penal order constitutes a reason in favor of 
forcible medication of defendants who are not competent to stand trial. 
And that those theorists who have held that the scales should tip in favor of 
forcible medication, by taking for granted the state’s interest in bringing 
criminals to justice, face serious penal theoretical challenges in order to 
underpin this conclusion.
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